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Abstract 
Today’s appearance of the city of Debrecen was greatly influenced by the fires 
of its history. Of these, the two most devastating should be highlighted, the fires 
of 1802 and of 1811. In connection with fire we intend to summarize the amount 
of damage by processing contemporary sources. After the fires more serious 
regulations on fire prevention began to emerge These disasters made people 
aware of the importance of fire protection. In connection with the 18th century 
town, we try to compare the fire protection regulations of the 18th century with 
the present one, and to make a comparison with the possibility of today’s fire 
formation by examining the cause of the fires.
Keywords: fire, fire policing disaster, disaster management authority, fire pro-
tection, prevention
Introduction
The name of the city ‘Debreczen’ is of Slavic origin, according to the histori-
ans of the city, the ancestors of this area were the Getaes and the ‘lizard-eyed’ 
Sarmatians long before the arrival of the Hungarians. Debrecen has played an 
outstanding role in all ages due to its geographical location, as it has been a hub 
for trade routes from the North, East and South. There is no other city in Hunga-
ry like Debrecen in the history which has been destroyed by so many catastro-
phes caused by fire. The written record of the oldest fire in the city dates back 
to 1245, in which the complete destruction of the Great Church happened, too. 
‘From our cities, Debrecen and Gyöngyös were so often destroyed by the ‘red 
rooster’ that they still stick in the memory of today’s people as the most typical 
examples of cities that have been burnt down. In the coat of arms of Debrecen, 
the phoenix symbolizes that the city was always rebuilt from its ashes […].’ 
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(Arany, Krisó & Rácz-Székely, 1985, 8.) In the course of our research, we ex-
amined the causes of the fires of 1802 and 1811, as well as on the parallels with 
today’s fire prevention authority regulations. Our research methods are a col-
lection and analysis of library and archival materials, with a particular focus on 
contemporary materials, as well as the city council documents. Unfortunately, 
the longer a damage occurred, the less likely it is that written memories that can 
be used and authentically present the event have survived. While processing the 
topic, I came to the conclusion that places that preserving written memories, such 
as libraries, schools, and city buildings, have in many cases been prey to fires. 
The Fire of 1802 and 1811 as A Disaster
In addition to the fires of 1802 and 1811, there were also significant devastat-
ing fires in Debrecen in 1561, 1565, 1568, 1580, 1623, 1639, 1640, 1656, 1669, 
1681, 1688, 1693, 1699, 1701, 1704, 1705, 1711, 1714, 1719, 1791 and in 1797. 
Several of these fires reached the current definition of disaster risk, and beyond 
that the disaster itself happened, as these events became identifiable with the 
factual elements of the concept, as, among other things, people’s lives, health, 
material values, basic care of the population. They endangered the environment 
and the organizations of the time were no longer able to take on the effective 
fight against these devastating effects in a coordinated manner. The causes of 
fires can be found in, among other things, contemporary construction habits, the 
lack of central regulation of prevention, and human negligence and intention-
ality Andreas Pinxner, a German traveller, also remembered the contemporary 
conditions following his stay in Debrecen in 1693, recording his experiences 
he wrote ‘He states…, the houses are usually low, built of loam, thatched, and 
the street in front of them is such as he good God created it: no sign of paving. 
It is horrible to think that if a fire broke out in a city like this during a windstorm, 
what a desperate devastation could befall the city.’  (Trócsányi, 1937, 138.) The 
lack of building habits and proper official control was also compounded by the 
fact that there were not using in those times matches or other devices suitable to 
produce a safe and controlled fire, so the fire was produced only with great ef-
fort with a so-called steel dowel. To eliminate the difficulty of this process, the 
fires were kept under constant surveillance in the fireplaces. It was a common 
practice to ‘borrow’ fires from each other, which was transferred from one place 
to another with a shovel, in which case there was also a high chance that a spark 
would cause an uncontrolled fire. The most endangered place was the eaves of 
thatched houses, as if the roof caught on fire, the whole rows of houses, streets 
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and parts of the city burned down in a short time. ‘The fire was so common – as 
we can see from the reports of newspapers published at the beginning of the last 
century, that perhaps it happened every day.’ (Trócsányi, 1937, 139.) Continu-
ous learning from the fires led to a series of regulations on, among other things, 
smoking, the use of candles, the storage of cob stacks, and certain rules for the 
pursuit in crafts. Unfortunately, the arsonists were sentenced to death in vain, 
the dangers were brought to the attention of the population, and fines and other 
punitive sentences were envisaged (Zoltai, 1903, 83.). Due to the geographical 
conditions, in the Great Plain there were often significant windstorms, as were 
several times dry, droughty days, all of which made it difficult to protect against 
fires. In today’s sense, fire-fighting technical devices, equipment and personal 
protective equipment can also be considered rudimentary and it was difficult to 
intervene effectively with them during a damage event. In addition to the envi-
ronmental impact and the negative impact of technical devices and equipment, 
the construction habits typical for these ages, as well as the lack of safe build-
ing regulations against fire, mostly contributed the most to the occurrence of 
such fires/disasters. The contemporary cityscape shows that the number of brick 
houses was very little, but their roof structure was usually covered with wooden 
shingles. On the other hand, most of the houses had ‘patics’ walls (mud-framed 
wooden frame structure) and hut-like, thatched roofs. The size of the parcels 
was characterized by their narrow and elongated design. These were usually 
built together and crowded with residential houses and other backyard build-
ings. In most cases, the fences were made out of wood and twig, so they could 
not form an obstacle to the wind (Zoltán, 1937, 296.). The architectural customs 
of the city did not change significantly over the centuries until the fires of the 
early 19th century. An arson took place in Debrecen on the 11th of June in 1802, 
which caused the biggest fire in the history of the city, in which ‘one thousand 
five hundred houses, fifteen mills and the tower building of the ancient dormi-
tory also burned down.’ (Arany, Krisó & Rácz-Székely, 1985, 8.) The fire also 
touched György Bessenyei, a contemporary poet who wrote his poem Debret-
zennek siralma poémában, in which he remembered of the fire that struck the 
city of Debrecen. He wrote about the wind, that caught up the fire and the cha-
otic conditions being present on the streets, as well as the despair of the people 
who had to experience the fire itself in person. The spread of the fire was also 
facilitated by the combined effect of environmental phenomena, which means 
that it was a dry and windy summer day, so on that very day at quarter to one 
at Kis-Csapó Street, around Morgó Street a fire broke out at the pigsty of a pal-
inka-selling old widow (Kabai, 1821, 20.). The surviving written memoirs are 
contradictory to the identity of the owner, according to some sources the own-
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er was a widow Mihályné, but according to others, it was István Dinnyés. The 
end of the pigsty led to a narrow ditch, which according to contemporary writ-
ings is considered to be the starting place of the fire. Learning from previous 
fires all the time, they were confident by the appropriate regulations and tools 
to put out the firefighting through continuous regulations, more or less. Unfor-
tunately, based on the negative coexistence of circumstances and the principle 
of domino effect, the occurrence of disaster has become inevitable. The perfect 
presence of all the conditions necessary for burning was given in the high wing, 
thus spreading from houses next to Csapó and Péterfia Street, destroying Dara-
bos Street, then through Kis-Hatvan Street the most of Miklós Street, as well 
as the area between Tizenháromváros Street, Piac Street and both Great- and 
Small Churches along with the  wooden bridge and café, taps and the external 
tents in the fairgrounds on Német Street. As a result of the fire, the church also 
suffered significant damage, as it was destroyed from the Great Church tow-
er, and the adjacent tower, the Red Tower, was also destroyed. Nothing shows 
the destructive heat effect of the fire better than the bell donated from György 
Rákóczi I. in the tower, which melted and fell in the fire.
Figure 1: The devastation of the fire of 1802 
(map drawings of the fire commander Jenő Roncsik / 1922–1945 /)
The devastation of the fire left poverty and famine, misery, scanty houses and 
hundreds of homeless people. The supply of the population also became inse-
cure, many people were left with no usable objects, the fire destroyed everything. 
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‘Not only nearby towns, but even the most remote cities, such as Bratislava, sent 
alms to help those affected by the fire. Donations were also collected quite a bit, 
but the reconstruction was difficult […]’  (Trócsányi, 1937, 144.)
The city’s fire record includes:
Streets: Properties: Damages in Forint: Dam. in korona:
Hatvan 262 188,594 27
Péterfia 147 143,665 30
Csapó 31 25,814 51
Piacz 303 176,907 54
Damage of the 
Reformed Church - 150,000 -
Damage of the 
Collegium - 26,412 35
Total: 713 711,395 Forints 17 Korona
Table 1: Damage caused by the fire of 1802 (created by Bence R. Lakatos)
But in addition to the above damages, the amount of each loss in ‘goods’ can 
be estimated at nearly 1.500.000 Forints. All the buildings of the church were 
destroyed or significantly damaged by the fire. In addition to the damage to the 
buildings, there was a significant intellectual loss to posterity, as a significant 
portion of the library and the books there were destroyed. In the fire, the wheat 
stored in the granary also became a prey to the fire. The consequence of food 
shortages was famine, for which they also had to find a solution (Gulyás, 1935, 
18.). The disaster caused significant material damage to the city, but claimed 
only one human casualty based on the surviving materials. Unfortunately, the 
cause of the arson did not fall into the hands of the authorities. Residents of the 
city, re-learning from the fire, began to rebuild the city. After the catastrophe, the 
city was again threatened by fire in 1811, according to some sources in a small 
inn on the 12th of April at noon, while according to most, a fire broke out in the 
pigsty next to the street of the belt-making master Mihály Vári living at the Cze-
gléd Street gate. It was not established in this case whether the fire was caused 
by human negligence or wilful arson. As a result of the fire, a significant part of 
Czegléd Street and Piac Street, the whole of Varga Street was destroyed, several 
inns, the Roman Catholic Church, the theatre, the Franciscan monastery, Miklós 
Street and 25 other mills were burnt down. The intensity and strength of the fire 
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is shown by the fact that in a ‘total’ of 4 hours it managed to destroy a significant 
part of the city. Compared to the fire of 1802, this was an event with significantly 
more casualties, 21 people (old, young, children), most of the casualties were in 
houses close to the source of the fire. As a result of the intense wind, people in 
the houses no longer had the opportunity to escape, or during the escape them-
selves they suffered such severe burns or inhalation heat damage that it was no 
longer possible to help them, so they lost their lives. In addition to the consider-
able fatalities, the number of those who suffered some degree of burns as a re-
sult of the fire, or according to the writings, was greatly reduced by the effects of 
heat, and many became blind. Following the fire, an assessment of the damage 
and the care of the homeless began, i.e. the provision of the necessary conditions 
for the survival of the population, when a fire broke out again at the end of the 
street in Hatvan Street on the 8th of April at 1 p.m., which spread rapidly and on 
Hatvan, Mester and Darabos Streets, among others, and in addition to Péterfia 
Street, another 25 mills were destroyed again (Zsoldos, 1917, 296.). The prob-
lem was also caused by the fact that in a very short time – 11 years – a consid-
erable part of the city was destroyed three times by fire, which caused more and 
more significant damage to the people living there and to the city management. 
Following the events, a smaller fire broke out on the 15th of April, where ‘only’ 
3 houses burned down. In 1811, as a result of fires over the course of two weeks, 
residents who lost their houses and property were forced to sleep in the open air, 
had nowhere to go. After assessing the damage of these two weeks ‘1497 resi-
dential houses, 540 chambers, 1224 barns and stables, 493 scenes and 50 dry 
mills, so more than half of the city. The total damage was 4,472,406 Forints, the 
fire was much larger than in 1802.’ (Roncsik, 1925, 20.)
The Contemporary Fire Protection Regulation of the City
The first fire preventive fire intervention measure of the city of Debrecen was 
taken in 1556, according to which a person who went to the barn with a candle 
without a lantern or fired i.e. used a rifle on an open street was punished. Pre-
ventive fire protection underwent continuous development. The association 
of firefighting students, which was one of the oldest organizations in the city, 
played a significant role in the performance of the city’s fire protection and fire-
fighting tasks, as they have been providing fire protection for our city for more 
than two hundred years. In addition to and in front of the students, there was 
a significant task for the guilds operating in our city. The life and activities of 
the student firefighters in Debrecen were regulated by the individual dormito-
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ry laws; accordingly, since 1664, it has been prescribed that they take an active 
part in the early detection of fires in the city and in their subsequent extinguish-
ing of fires (Roncsik, 1934, 18.). The city leadership has determined to ’get 50 
leather buckets and multiply the number of water rifles per hundred at the ex-
pense of the city first’. (Tarján, 1964, 17.) Following the constantly evolving 
rules and regulations, the regulations for machinists such as water syringe op-
erators and those assigned to the machineries and early detection of fire were 
most precisely issued in the protocol containing the detailed regulations of the 
‘Acta Curatoratus et Professoratus’ on 25 November 1798. When it was cre-
ated, the teaching staff asked for a preliminary opinion from the students, and 
then this set of rules was created taking these into account (Nagy, 1957, 33.).
Figure 2: The devastation of the fire of 1811 
(map drawings of the fire commander Jenő Roncsik /1922–1945/)
The organization of the Student Fire Brigade had a complex system of subordi-
nation and division of tasks compared to the expectations of the age. The enthu-
siasm, courage and professionalism of the students is also shown by the fact that 
during its existence it was able to curb many fires and prevent them from esca-
lating into catastrophes caused by fire. Unfortunately, it was the student body that 
was one of the weak points of this fire brigade organization, as the students spent 
their time in the school system in connection with their firefighting duties and, 
with few exceptions, barely stayed in the dormitory building, so they could not 
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protect the city. Unfortunately, the fire on the 11th of July in 1802, also fell into 
the Whitsun period, when students were not in the dormitory building, so the 
Great Church, along with the Dorm and its associated machineries as a fire sta-
tion, were able to burn down a significant part of the city. In the aftermath of con-
stant fires, a series of provisions were made to try to prevent these incidents, such 
as the rule in 1556 that at least one bowl of water should be stored in front of each 
house, or, for example, that night baking was prohibited from 1629, along with 
cooking, washing and also firing in smaller shops. City leaders soon realized the 
activities of guilds pursuing open-flame crafts as a source of danger. According 
to the remaining written records, the fire policing regulations of Debrecen in the 
17th and 18th centuries were characterized by empirical regulation and the subse-
quent nature of fire policing regulations, so the regulations were always preceded 
by some major fire. In the 18th century, as a result of many fires, the development 
of regulations based not only on customary law but also on written legal norms 
became topical, thus ensuring the development of an adequate level of fire pro-
tection. By the end of the century, the fire protection patron issued by King Jo-
seph II of Hungary in 1788 was the first to summarize the fire protection tasks at 
the legal level. This patent was the first to include provisions for three areas of 
fire protection in the modern sense, fire prevention, firefighting, and fire inspec-
tion. Among the royal commissioner’s documents of the Hajdú-Bihar County 
Archives are the provisions of the Free and Royal City of Debreczen on Fire Or-
ders established by the Governing Council in 1799. Among its most important 
provisions are the reduction of wooden structures and wooden chimneys in ad-
dition to the construction of brick-built houses, but unfortunately the construction 
of bricks was not suggested in a coercive way, but with the words ‘whose talent 
allows’. There are also regulations for cleaning contemporary stoves, chimneys, 
and for handling and using fuels and equipment. The ‘naked’ transportation of 
burning candles also entailed severe punishment in the age. Smoking, where and 
in what form it can be used safely, has also been regulated. Provisions referring 
to industrial safety include, for example, laying down requirements for dealers 
and producers of gunpowder, but its most interesting provision with regard to fire 
protection is ‘also urge your maid to be diligent: cover the fire well in the kitchen 
so that the cat cannot take it in its fur’. In addition to fire prevention rules, it also 
contains the most important requirements for firefighting tactics, such as ensur-
ing the supply of extinguishing water, preventing fires by demolishing tiles, i.e. 
removing combustible material from the fire path. It also includes the responsi-
bilities of those involved in firefighting. Although the provisions were for-
ward-looking, the problem was that some provisions were not binding or, due to 
pre-existing architectural features and human habits, could not provide adequate 
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protection against them in the event of a disaster becoming catastrophic. There 
was no organization at the appropriate level assigned to the rules, which could 
check the continuous observance of the described rules with sufficient thorough-
ness and professional knowledge as its main task. From 1799 onwards, the de-
scriptions of the fires and the descriptions of the measures taken were treated 
separately from the other provisions in the so-called Incendiarium Protocollum. 
Also in terms of the city’s structure and architectural methods, in order to prevent 
fires, it would have been essential for the houses to be covered with brick or stone 
instead of wood, and for the roof structure to be covered with tiles instead of reeds 
or shingles. Unfortunately, this would have made construction much more expen-
sive, as due to the geographical location of the city, the soil conditions in the city 
were not suitable for making good quality bricks, and in the absence of mountains, 
there was little stone and transportation would have meant significant increase of 
costs. Another reason that city dwellers have historically ‘become accustomed to’ 
a lot of people turning up as commercial hubs and many times malicious arson-
ists have appeared in the city is why they did not want to embark on construction 
with higher safety but higher costs. Thus, the construction habits did not really 
change, which was accompanied by the holidays of the student firefighters and 
the negative impact of the natural elements, so that the devastation caused by the 
great fire of 1802 easily occurred on the basis of these. Following the damage de-
scribed above, the city council considered it even more important to change con-
struction habits, prioritizing the use of bricks and tiles. To make this happen, Mi-
hály Péchy took land samples from different parts of the city in order to find out 
which part of the city would be more suitable for making bricks. The expert opin-
ion arrived in 1803 and designated the brick-laying sites in the brick garden, from 
which point the ‘rebuilding’ of houses and buildings in the city using bricks and 
tiles began. The Town Archives contain the provisions of Royal Commission No. 
47 of 1804, which, when examined, show that they were determined by learning 
from the circumstances of the origin and spread of the fire, in which several for-
ward-looking provisions are included, still applied today. The city council’s pro-
tocol of 1808 regulated the basic rules for firewall construction, the rules for room 
connections, and also gave priority to the fire distances to be maintained between 
adjacent properties and buildings on one’s own property (Szűcs, 1872, 32-37.). 
The council also regulated that the gates of the properties should be kept dry, free 
of gas and vegetation. Also in the case of various crafts, such as the construction 
of a blacksmith’s, locksmith’s or other workshop with fire, attention had to be 
paid to the appropriate fire distance, and the workshop must be built of non-com-
bustible materials. By creating these rules, the cityscape of Debrecen was chang-
ing. The fires of 1811 also contributed to the development and enforcement of 
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safer building and fire prevention rules. In a letter to the city council dated 15 
December, the city’s royal commissioner, Farkas Ibrányi, stated the following: 
‘the main mistakes due to the fire are the non-execution of good orders, which the 
council has repeatedly urged but failed to enforce there is not a sufficient number 
of water rifles, although the council has already instructed the governor to pro-
cure them in 1799, the building code decree has not been implemented, everyone 
is building the way they want, covering the house with reeds and straw despite 
the ban, the dangerous weed buildings are still in the former state, the decrees 
are only on paper, so the council has not fulfilled its duty to the safety of the city 
residents and integrity.’ (Síró, 2007, 59-60.) Learning from the fires, the city man-
agement realized that the width of the streets also played a key role, as most of 
the streets in the city were very narrow during this period. After the constant fire, 
there was always an attempt to make the streets wider and to cover them with only 
minimal ground (Sápi, 1957, 90-94.). Smoking has also emerged as a typical 
problem of the age, the habit of which has become more and more widespread 
and has affected almost all ages of the population. In order to prevent fires, smok-
ing was also banned and punished in some places, including shops and barber 
shops, as well as for certain individuals, such as soldiers.
Another problem was the lack of water, to which the city management also 
had to find a solution to, as the captain water prescribed for the houses meant 
nothing in a major fire, the city was often hit by drought and wind due to its 
location, so there was no water in the wells in summer, and unfortunately the 
city does not have a river either (Roncsik, 1926). The problem of adequate ex-
tinguishing water could not be appropriately remedied or some time, so it was 
necessary to provide adequate extinguishing technology, for this purpose in 
1804 and 1812 a census was made of the public and private equipment of the 
city, which established that:
Name of assets: Census in 1804: Census in 1812:
1. syringe 8 11
2. barrel cart 10 20
3. bathtub 30 19
4. tub 3 3
5. pickaxe 12 26
6. leather bucket 47 180
7. straw bucket 124 4
8. ladder 0 21
Table 2: Technical fire-fighting equipment available in 1804 and 1812, respectively (created by 
Bence R. Lakatos)
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Graph 1: Private and public firefighting equipment (created by Bence R. Lakatos)
Following the two fires examined, more and more emphasis was placed on fire 
protection and the organizational regulation of the Fire Brigade by the city man-
agement. Thanks to continuous improvements, major catastrophic fires could 
no longer occur in the life of the city, as increasing safety has become a prima-
ry consideration for both the city administration and the population. The graph 
also shows that the applied firefighting technical equipment was continuously 
modernized, as the less efficient equipment was withdrawn, while the more ef-
ficient equipment was regularized and increased in number.
Fire Protection Authority Analysis of the Two Disasters
In this chapter, we are drawing a parallel with the reasoning between the regu-
lation that developed after 1802 and the fire protection provisions in force to-
day. Based on our research, it can be seen that experiential prevention is the 
forerunner of central fire protection, which began in the 19th century in the life 
of the city. The fires that have developed in the country, as many of them with 
the characteristics of today’s catastrophe, have led to the emergence of more 
and more provisions not only in the city, but also on a national level, and the 
country’s leaders needed to realize that the issue of fire protection needs to be 
regulated. The basic principles of fire protection have not changed in the past 
two hundred years, only the formulations have become more accurate and pre-
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improved, thus, we are examining the relationship between the contemporary 
Royal Commission Decree No. 47 of 1804 and the Decree 54/2014 (XII. 5.) of 
the National Fire Protection Regulations, as amended on 22 January 2020, and 
other legal provisions related to fire protection, by way of the example below.
Comparison of Royal Commission Decree No. 47 of 1804 and current legislation:
Royal Commission 
Decree No. 47 of 1804
Decree 54/2014 (XII 5) of the Ministry of the Interior on the National 
Fire Protection Regulations (hereinafter: NFPR.) (URL1)
‘1. A deputation has 
been appointed to draw 
up fire and building 
regulations.
The enactment of the decree was also adopted and promulgated with the ap-
propriate level of professional training and living conditions included in Law 
XXX of 2010 on Legislation.
2. Construction plans 
must be presented in 
advance.
Section 1 (1) (a) of the NFPR stipulates that fire protection requirements 
must be observed, inter alia, during the design and construction of the facility, 
structure or part of a building. In addition, provision must be made for the 
plans to be submitted to the building authority and, where appropriate, to the 
competent authority.
3. Only brick and 
tile-covered buildings 
should be constructed 
near larger and public 
buildings.
The regulations in force specify, inter alia, the requirements for the fire pro-
tection class and fire resistance performance of building structures, depend-
ing on the purpose.
4. Buildings from a 
neighbour should al-
ways be equipped with 
a brick firewall.
The NFPR defines the concept of basic fire protection structures, which can 
be a firewall, a fire barrier and a fire slab. Protection against the spread of fire 
can be provided according to law, for example by setting up a firewall. For 
the material of the firewall are the expected fire resistance performance and 
fire protection classes specified.
5. The master mason is 
responsible for making 
the firewalls for 5 years.
Section 40 (1) (a) - (c) of Law LXXVIII of 1997 on the Shaping and Protec-
tion of the Built Environment defines the responsibility of the contractor for 
the lawful commencement and continuation of the construction activity, the 
existence of the contractor’s right, […] as a result of the work performed for 
the intended and safe use of the established structures, equipment, structures, 
parts of structures (URL2).
6. Stables, pig sheds 
cannot be built in a 
narrow yard.
Pursuant to the provisions of Government Decree 253/1997 (XII. 20.) on 
national settlement planning and construction requirements, the conditions 
for the placement of livestock structures - taking into account public health 
and animal health, as well as environmental protection requirements - may 
be established by the local building regulations. The nearly 200-year-old pro-
vision was intended to prevent build-in causing easier spread of fire (URL3).
7. Stables and pigsties 
must not be built 
against the wall of the 
neighbour.
The NFPR defines the concept of fire distance, so it means the minimum per-
mitted horizontally measured distance between adjacent structures belonging 
to a separate fire section, adjacent outdoor storage units, an adjacent structure, 
and an outdoor storage unit. After all, Section 17 (1) a) -d) of the NFPR stip-
ulates that the spread of fire must be prevented.
Provisions 8 and 9 It has no fire protection aspect.
10. The garden at the 
back of the property 
should not be installed.
In the current regulations of the NFPR, I would draw a parallel with the provi-
sion that in order to ensure the effectiveness of the fire brigade’s intervention, 
unobstructed access to the structure by a firefighting vehicle must be ensured. 
Due to the tools and circumstances used in contemporary regulation, it was 
necessary to determine such installations in this way. The current rules for 
installation requirements should be in accordance with local building codes.
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11. Hay and straw 
should only be stored in 
the attic of the barn, not 
in the attic of a residen-
tial building.
Section 191 of the NFPR stipulates that material belonging to a highly flam-
mable or explosive class may not be stored in the attic. Other solids may 
only be placed in such a way and in such a quantity that they do not obstruct 
access to the roof structure and the chimney, can be removed from combus-
tible elements of the roof structure if necessary and be at least 1 m away from 
the chimney. Furthermore, the building, part of the building, the open space 
may only be used in accordance with the fire protection requirements for its 
intended use.
12. Firewood should 
not be kept in the yard 
to a large extent.
No storage is allowed within the fire distance, unless the quantity, quality 
and location of the stored material do not increase the risk of fire spreading. 
This area should be kept free of debris and dry undergrowth. In addition, the 
building, part of the building, the open space may only be used in accordance 
with the fire protection requirements for its intended use. The legislation also 
sets out requirements for outdoor storage areas.
13. Fences or faces are 
not allowed to be made 
out of reed or picket.
The regulation was created for the purpose of protection against the spread of 
today’s fire, which is: a set of solutions, the continuous application of which 
can prevent the spread of fire to the protected structure, part of the structure, 
outdoor storage unit; methods: fire distance, fire protection structure, built-
in fire protection equipment, other design providing fire propagation limit 
or fire resistance performance. According to the contemporary perception, 
the goal was to be able to reduce significantly the use of these combustible 
materials.
14. The building must 
not be covered with 
straw or weed.
The purpose of the contemporary provision was also to prevent the spread 
of fire, the current NFPR on roofing stipulates that § 31 (1) - (2) stipulates 
that for roofing […] material of fire protection class E, or F may be used as a 
roof covering if the structure has no more than one floor level and it has been 
approved by the fire protection authority for the given structure […].
15. In tight spaces, reed 
gutters should not be 
built on the street.
The NFPR defines the concept of a barrier against the spread of fire, such as 
a barrier that prevents the spread of fire between the building levels, fire sec-
tions, roof fields, and adjacent buildings. The design and geometry of the bar-
riers against the spread of fire must ensure the limitation of the spread of fire.
16. Narrow street hous-
es with a full wall of 8 
feet are permitted.
In addition to ensuring the fire distance, the NFPR can protect against the 
spread of fire with, among other things, a firewall design. In terms of focal 
length, a kind of contemporary vertical focal length was defined.
17. On a narrow street, 
the building opposite 
can lay at least 6 fath-
oms away.
The protection against the spread of fire shall be determined in accordance 
with Tables 1 to 3 of Annex 3 of the NFPR, in the case of a special structure, 
in accordance with Chapter XII or by calculation to ensure the fire distance.
18. The neighbour is 
obliged to report the 
ones who do not obey 
the rules.
Pursuant to Section 5 (1) of Law XXXI of 1996 on Fire Protection, Technical 
Rescue and Fire, whoever detects a fire or an imminent danger thereof, must 
immediately report it to the call centre, the operational management depart-
ment of the disaster management directorate or the fire brigade, or if this is 
not possible, to the police or the ambulance service or the mayor’s office of 
the municipality (URL4).
19. If a person’s house 
is demolished in order 
to prevent the spread of 
fire, the council shall 
reimburse it.’
Section 8 (1) of Section 5 (1) of Law XXXI of 1996 on Fire Protection, Tech-
nical Rescue and Fire provides that, as regards compensation, the maintainer 
of the fire brigade is obliged by the fire brigade is liable damage caused 
by non-contractual liability. The maintainer must pay a compensation for 
non-recoverable damage to third parties caused by fire intervention technical 
rescue or fire intervention or technical rescue practices in connection with 
firefighting, technical rescue or technical rescue, with the exception of lost 
property benefits (URL4).
Table 3: Comparison of Royal Decree No. 47 of 1804 and current legislation 
(created by Bence R. Lakatos)
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Based on the above provisions, we can see that our current rules can be paral-
leled with the legal provisions of the times presented but based on the research 
it can be clearly stated that due to social conditions and technical development, 
more precise, precise and complex legal regulations are always needed. In ad-
dition to the legal provisions, there was a need for an organization with an ap-
propriate system of official tasks, tools, and measures to ensure effective and 
preventive central fire prevention. It was characteristic of the contemporary 
regulation of the city of Debrecen and the country that it did not yet have such 
an organization. For the contemporary duties, one person usually had several 
specializations and generally performed law enforcement duties in the course 
of their own work. At the time of the fires of 1802 and 1811, and in the case of 
the disasters that preceded them, there was no proper organization, no impor-
tant licensing processes during construction, then no feedback during the use, 
no methods of inspections, no continuous monitoring, and not a control system 
with a frequency appropriate to their level of danger. Although the city admin-
istration of those time created certain sanctions and measures to comply with 
the fire protection rules of the time, back these were not accompanied by suffi-
cient deterrent power in several cases. After that, the various regulatory areas, 
such as fire protection, also underwent continuous specialization. In the case 
of contemporary fires, I should also mention the significant role that the exist-
ence of today’s field of civil protection would have played with the associated 
human and material resources, as we could see that in both cases people who 
lost their homes had nowhere to go and their food supply and the health care of 
the injured were also hampered. In today’s system, this would not be possible, 
as we can also see from the legal definition of civil protection that it is their 
task to provide the conditions and take the necessary action, so it would be the 
task of today’s professional disaster management organization. With today’s 
rules on eviction, evacuation and reception, and the existence of the necessary 
action plans at the time, would have been possible to secure people in desig-
nated reception areas according to the protocols, to take care of their food and 
health care, among other things.
Summary
The person of Jenő Vitéz Roncsik, who can be certainly called on of the poly-
maths of fire protection in Hungary, and later on he became the first chief fire-
fighter of the city of Debrecen, played a key role in the establishment and regu-
lation of the Hungarian fire protection including prevention and fire intervention. 
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He also owed his knowledge to his extensive qualifications and experience, as 
well as his faith in the work. He believed in the importance of fire protection 
and the triple division of tasks. In the research of authors, according to the doc-
uments revealed, it can be stated that we could have prevented the destruction 
of the two fires by observing today’s rules and by the central authorities of 
prevention, which play an important role in enforcement, and by our sophis-
ticated sanction system, and thanks to our sophisticated sanction system, we 
could have prevented and, in the event of an incident, the damage could have 
been minimized by using effective firefighting tactics and the deployment of 
trained and appropriate personnel with effective technical equipment. January 
1, 2012 brought significant changes in the field of fire protection, at which time 
the disaster management bodies were reorganized, thus a professional disaster 
management organization based on sub-superiority and operating under unified 
management could be established. Prior to the entry into force of the legislation, 
even independent professional municipal fire brigades were integrated, so that 
professional fire brigades were established as a local body of the professional 
disaster management organization in connection with the branch offices. Lo-
cal, regional, and national government departments have emerged that play an 
essential role in performing complex and effective fire prevention tasks. Their 
task is to minimize the chances of a fire and to protect the lives and property 
of both the interveners and the public in the event of a possible damage event.
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